This volume honours the life and work of Solomon Feferman, one of the most prominent mathematical logicians of the latter half of the 20th century. In the collection of essays presented here, researchers examine Feferman's work on mathematical as well as specific methodological and philosophical issues that tie into mathematics. Feferman's work was largely based in mathematical logic (namely model theory, set theory, proof theory and computability theory), but also branched out into methodological and philosophical issues, making it well known beyond the borders of the mathematics community. With regard to methodological issues, Feferman supported concrete projects. On the one hand, these projects calibrate the proof theoretic strength of subsystems of analysis and set theory and provide ways of overcoming the limitations imposed by Goedel's incompleteness theorems through appropriate conceptual expansions. On the other, they seek to identify novel axiomatic foundations for mathematical practice, truth theories, and category theory. In his philosophical research, Feferman explored questions such as "What is logic?" and proposed particular positions regarding the foundations of mathematics including, for example, his "conceptual structuralism." The contributing authors of the volume examine all of the above issues. Their papers are accompanied by an autobiography presented by Feferman that reflects on the evolution and intellectual contexts of his work. The contributing authors critically examine Feferman's work and, in part, actively expand on his concrete mathematical projects. The volume illuminates Feferman's distinctive work and, in the process, provides an enlightening perspective on the foundations of mathematics and logic.

In the fall of 1985 Carnegie Mellon University established a Department of Philosophy. The focus of the department is logic broadly conceived, philos- ophy of science, in particular of the social sciences, and linguistics. To mark the inauguration of the department, a daylong celebration was held on April 5, 1986. This celebration consisted of two keynote addresses by Patrick Sup- pes and Thomas Schwartz, seminars directed by members of the department, and a panel discussion on the computational model of mind moderated by Dana S. Scott. The various contributions, in modified and expanded form, are the core of this collection of essays, and they are, I believe, of more than parochial interest: they turn attention to substantive and reflective interdis- ciplinary work. The collection is divided into three parts. The first part gives perspec- tives (i) on general features of the interdisciplinary enterprise in philosophy (by Patrick Suppes, Thomas Schwartz, Herbert A. Simon, and Clark Gly- mour) , and (ii) on a particular topic that invites such interaction, namely computational models of the mind (with contributions by Gilbert Harman, John Haugeland, Jay McClelland, and Allen Newell). The second part con- tains (mostly informal) reports on concrete research done within that enter- prise; the research topics range from decision theory and the philosophy of economics through foundational problems in mathematics to issues in aes- thetics and computational linguistics. The third part is a postscriptum by Isaac Levi, analyzing directions of (computational) work from his perspective.

These documents do nothing less than bear witness to one of the most dramatic changes in the foundations of science. The book has three sections that cover general relativity, epistemological issues, and quantum mechanics. This fascinating work will be a vital text for historians and philosophers of physics, as well as researchers in related physical theories.

Grigori Mints is one the most distinguished proof theorists of our time. He has contributed significantly not only to the subject in general but also to most of its applications. This collection of papers by a number of Mints' colleagues worldwide are both a personal tribute and a testimony to his breadth and importance by dealing with all areas in which Mints has worked: from proof-theoretical reductions through non-classical logics and category theory to automated theorem proving and proof mining, i.e., the extraction of mathematical information from formal proofs. The collection itself is significant for another reason: it bridges the two logical worlds in which Mints has worked, the world of the former Soviet Union and that of the West.

In the fall of 1985 Carnegie Mellon University established a Department of Philosophy. The focus of the department is logic broadly conceived, philos- ophy of science, in particular of the social sciences, and linguistics. To mark the inauguration of the department, a daylong celebration was held on April 5, 1986. This celebration consisted of two keynote addresses by Patrick Sup- pes and Thomas Schwartz, seminars directed by members of the department, and a panel discussion on the computational model of mind moderated by Dana S. Scott. The various contributions, in modified and expanded form, are the core of this collection of essays, and they are, I believe, of more than parochial interest: they turn attention to substantive and reflective interdis- ciplinary work. The collection is divided into three parts. The first part gives perspec- tives (i) on general features of the interdisciplinary enterprise in philosophy (by Patrick Suppes, Thomas Schwartz, Herbert A. Simon, and Clark Gly- mour) , and (ii) on a particular topic that invites such interaction, namely computational models of the mind (with contributions by Gilbert Harman, John Haugeland, Jay McClelland, and Allen Newell). The second part con- tains (mostly informal) reports on concrete research done within that enter- prise; the research topics range from decision theory and the philosophy of economics through foundational problems in mathematics to issues in aes- thetics and computational linguistics. The third part is a postscriptum by Isaac Levi, analyzing directions of (computational) work from his perspective.

The core of Volume3 consists of lecture notes for seven sets of lectures Hilbert gave (often in collaboration with Bernays) on the foundations of mathematics between 1917 and 1926. These texts make possible for the first time a detailed reconstruction of the rapid development of Hilbert's foundational thought during this period, and show the increasing dominance of the metamathematical perspective in his logical work: the emergence of modern mathematical logic; the explicit raising of questions of completeness, consistency and decidability for logical systems; the investigation of the relative strengths of various logical calculi; the birth and evolution of proof theory, and the parallel emergence of Hilbert's finitist standpoint. The lecture notes are accompanied by numerous supplementary documents, both published and unpublished, including a complete version of Bernays's "Habilitationschrift" of 1918, the text of the first edition of Hilbert and Ackermann's "Grundzuge der theoretischen Logik" (1928), and several shorter lectures by Hilbert from the later 1920s. These documents, which provide the background to Hilbert and Bernays's monumental "Grundlagen der Mathematik" (1934, 1938), are essential for understanding the development of modern mathematical logic, and for reconstructing the interactions between Hilbert, Bernays, Brouwer, and Weyl in the philosophy of mathematics. "

Kurt Gödel was the most outstanding logician of the 20th century and a giant in the field. This book is part of a five volume set that makes available all of Gödels writings. The first three volumes, already published, consist of the papers and essays of Gödel. The final two volumes of the set deal with Gödel's correspondence with his contemporary mathematicians, this fourth volume consists of material from correspondents from A-G.

Kurt Gödel was the most outstanding logician of the 20th century and a giant in the field. This book is part of a five volume set that makes available all of Gödels writings. The first three volumes, already published, consist of the papers and essays of Gödel. The final two volumes of the set deal with Gödel's correspondence with his contemporary mathematicians, this fifth volume consists of material from correspondents from H-Z.